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“However, there is no peace without justice; there is no justice without  truth,  meaning  the  entire
truth and nothing but the truth.”[1]
Abstract
One of the most important functions of the international criminal trial is to create an accurate and
accessible historical record. This paper analyses to what  extent  plea  bargaining  can  hinder  or
facilitate the establishment of the historical record. Drawing on the experience  of  the  ICTY  and
the ICTR the author makes a number of proposals as to what how and  to  extent  plea  bargaining
should be used at the ICC to advance rather than to obstruct the historical record.
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The Importance of the Historical Record
“[I]t is only the truth that can cleanse the ethnic and religious hatreds and begin the healing
process”[2]
The most important function of international criminal justice is the  restoration  of  peace.  Indeed,
when the United Nations Security Council decided to set  up  international  criminal  tribunals  for
the conflicts in Yugoslavia[3] and Rwanda[4] they could do  so  only  within  the  mandate  of  the
Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations  Charter  under  the  assumption  that  a
criminal trial is able to further international peace and security.[5] It is understood that  no  lasting
peace can be achieved without justice  for  at  least  some  of  the  violence  committed  during  the
conflict. However, justice is not served only by prosecuting and  sentencing  individual  offenders.
What is of equal importance is that the roots, background and development, in short, the history of
the conflict is exposed. The extent of the victims’ suffering, the hierarchy of  the  power  structure,
the planning policies and any contributing factors need  to  be  revealed.  Only  when  the  truth  is
established  can  reconciliation  begin.[6]  This  is  particularly  true  with  respect  to  the  role   of
propaganda in widespread human rights violations. When violence is committed  on  such  a  large
scale, turning so many civilians not only into victims but also into perpetrators it has  to  be  based
on  policies  which  could  have  been  implemented  only  by  the  extensive  use  of   propaganda.
Propaganda is at the centre of inciting  ordinary  citizens  to  exercise  unbelievable  violence.  The
victim group needs to be portrayed both as sub-human as well as threatening in order  to  convince
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fellow citizens. By establishing a historical record it is hoped to „pierce  the  distortions  generated
by  official  propaganda“[7]  “before  the  guilty  could  reinvent  the  truth”.[8]  In  addition  it   is
important to put names to the central faces behind  the  atrocities  so  that  individuals  rather  than
groups are blamed. One generally expects “that such a historical record would prevent  a  cycle  of
revenge killings and future acts of aggression“.[9] Besides its value for healing and reconciliation,
truth telling is also essential at the political level to foster the  difficult  transition  from  repressive
regimes to democracy.[10] A detailed historical record will  help  the  new  leadership  to  make  a
clear break with the violent history and build a social and political system  in  which  repetition  of
the conflict will  be  prevented.  Consequently,  to  establish  as  accurate  as  possible  a  historical
record of the roots  and  the  development  of  the  violence  is  one  of  the  main  functions  of  all
international criminal courts.
The  term  plea  bargaining  is  used  here  as  a  generic  expression   for   different   forms   of
agreements  between  the  Defence  and  the  Prosecution  (and  sometimes  even  the  court).   The
common denominator is that the defendant admits all or some of  the  charges  in  exchange  for  a
lower sentence. Very often there are additional parts to the deal, such as  a  promise  to  waive  the
right to appeal, to provide evidence against other  defendants,  or  to  help  locating  assets  etc.  In
exchange the Prosecution offers to drop some of the charges or to  replace  them  with  charges  of
lesser crimes[11] (charge bargaining) or to recommend a particular sentence  or  sentencing  range
to the court (sentence bargaining). Other offers to defendants include dropping  charges  against  a
spouse,  or  special  prison  conditions,  for  example  the  location  of  imprisonment  in  a  certain
country. In the ICTR for example,  many  defendants  would  prefer  a  European  prison  not  only
because often the families of defendants  of  high  rank  have  relocated  in  Europe  but  moreover
because European criminal justice systems mostly offer early release after  half  or  a  third  of  the
sentence has been served.[12] In Rutaganira, for example, the Prosecution agreed  to  recommend
that the sentence should be served in Europe or Swaziland (rather than in Mali where  most  ICTR
convicts serve).[13]
Once the defendant has admitted his  or  her  guilt  no  trial  is  needed[14]  and  the  procedure
moves on to the sentencing stage. Plea bargaining in some form or other[15] has developed in  the
United States in the  19th  Century[16]  and  then  rapidly  spread  to  many  other  criminal  justice
systems including civil law countries such as  Germany,  France  and  Italy.[17]  It  has  now  been
used even in international criminal law.[18] In domestic criminal  law  it  is  often  claimed  that  a
modern criminal justice system would collapse if it were not for the fact that the majority of  trials
are replaced by informal negotiations.[19] However, while supporters praise the efficiency of  this
practice that frees up so  many  resources,  opponents  warn  that  defendants  lose  the  procedural
safeguards of a trial (most of all the presumption of innocence), that victims are not heard, that the
public is excluded and that convicted criminals receive too lenient sentences.
This paper discusses whether the practice of plea bargaining might threaten the  courts’  ability
to establish an accurate and accessible historical record and thus might undermine one of  its  most
important functions. It will focus on the two international tribunals, the ICTY and the  ICTR.  The
ICTY has been chosen as a case study of how plea bargaining has been introduced to international
law and has developed over  the  years.  The  ICTR  on  the  other  hand,  is  one  of  the  very  few
examples  where  the  Tribunal  and  the  Prosecution  have  not  succeeded  in   establishing   plea
bargaining as wide used practice. After having examined  the  development  and  problems  at  the
two ad hoc tribunals this paper concludes by making a number of  proposals  for  the  use  of  plea
bargaining in the International Criminal Court (ICC).
The Trial as Fact Finding Tool
“We must establish incredible events by credible evidence.”[20]
The close link between historical truth, reconciliation and  peace  mentioned  above  is  the  reason
why so many transitional societies have established Truth  and  Reconciliation  Commissions.[21]
International criminal trials, too, play  a  decisive  role  in  establishing  an  accurate  and  publicly
accessible historical record. Yet one has to examine closely what contribution a criminal  trial  can
make. Neither judges  nor  prosecutors  nor  defence  counsels  are  normally  trained  in  historical
research and only rarely are historians invited to  give  expert  testimony.[22]  In  addition  to  this
there are three aspects of a criminal trial which potentially hinder the courts’ capacity  to  create  a
useful historical record.
First  of  all,   most   ad   hoc   tribunals   have   only   a   limited   temporal   and/or   territorial
jurisdiction[23]  which  often  does  not  cover  the  whole  conflict.  For  example,  the  ICTR  has
jurisdiction only over the events of the year 1994[24] not including the crimes before or  after  this
time. Further, like municipal courts, international courts have to work with very limited  resources
and have to confine themselves to a minority of many  possible  cases.  Accordingly  they  usually
concentrate on those most responsible for the most serious  crimes,  such  as  political  or  military
leaders, while a great number of perpetrators are not even investigated.[25] And  even  in  the  few
remaining cases the Prosecution very often does not charge all  possible  offences  but  focuses  on
certain events at a certain location (maybe one concentration camp) or  of  a  certain  date  (maybe
the date of one massacre).[26] Consequently, in total only a small minority  of  crimes  committed
in a  conflict  will  be  brought  to  justice  and  made  part  of  the  historical  record  of  the  court.
Nevertheless, concentrating on the most responsible offenders and  uncovering  their  contribution
and responsibility will add valuable information to the history of the whole conflict.
Secondly, only individuals are put on trial[27] and all evidence has to be related to the relevant
charges against this individual defendant rather than the general historic background. Many  argue
therefore that truth commissions are in a better position to paint  a  comprehensive  picture  of  the
broader context  of  the  violence.[28]  Having  said  this  one  must  not  forget  that  many  of  the
offences require the Prosecution to prove elements which comprise the  general  background  such
as  the  presence  of  an  international  or  non-international  armed  conflict[29]  a  widespread   or
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group.[31] Thus the fact finding of an individual case  might  very  well  include  evidence  of  the
larger context of the  conflict  including  the  operation  of  the  regime  and  general  policies,  co-
operation between different agencies, the role of the media, the involvement  of  army  and  police
etc.
Finally, fact finding in court is  limited  by  very  strict  evidential  rules  which  might  declare
evidence inadmissible even if it is of vital value for the historical record.[32]  However,  the  rules
of evidence are generally much freer than in most  adversarial  systems.  For  example,  the  Rome
Statute  does  not  exclude  hearsay  evidence[33]  which  is  often  inadmissible  in  common  law
countries. The prime example of successful  building  of  a  historical  record  are  the  Nuremberg
trials which in less than eleven months in only twenty-two cases  exposed  the  Holocaust  and  the
workings of the Nazi regime.[34] Today Germany under Nazi rule is  one  of  the  best  researched
times  in  history.  The  Prosecution  in  spite  of   being   dependent   on   state   co-operation   has
investigative powers which  far  exceed  the  possibilities  of  a  historian,  such  as  access  to  eye
witnesses, expert witnesses and documents.  Beyond  and  above  establishing  a  historical  record
through trial  does  not  only  help  to  find  out  what  happened  but  moreover  it  provides  for  a
mechanism  to  validate  these  findings.  The  limits  of  evidential  and  procedural   rules   confer
legitimacy and credibility to the outcome. An independent court establishes facts through a  public
trial where each element needs to be  proven  beyond  reasonable  doubt.  Thus  not  only  will  the
criminal investigation uncover the truth but the test of a  criminal  trial  will  also  validate  it.  The
thorough investigation of high profile offenders, the strict rules of  evidence  and  the  rule  of  law
which allows both sides to be heard make the international criminal trial a most appropriate forum
for building an accurate historical record of the atrocities.
Does Plea Bargaining Hinder Building of a Historical Record?
“The Trial Chamber finds that, on balance, guilty pleas pursuant to  plea  agreements,  may
further the work – and the mandate – of the Tribunal.”[35]
Having established the  importance  of  the  historical  record  and  the  important  contribution  an
international criminal trial can make it will now be examined to what extent  the  practice  of  plea
bargaining supports or undermines  this  aim.  After  reviewing  briefly  the  development  of  plea
bargaining at the ICTY this section will examine the effects of plea bargaining on the  building  of
a historical record, i.e. the avoidance of the full trial, the dropping of charges and  the  question  of
how to validate whether a guilty plea is genuine.
1 Development in ICTY
During the process of drafting the ICTY  Statute[36]  and  its  Rules  of  Evidence  and  Procedure
(ICTY-RPE)   the   United   States   proposed   to   incorporate    plea    bargaining[37]    but    was
unsuccessful.[38] When the question was raised again later, the tribunal made it quite clear that an
international criminal tribunal was no place for plea bargaining.[39] Acknowledging some  of  the
benefits of plea bargaining the then President Antonio Cassese declared that the crimes before this
tribunal were too abhorrent to be part of a negotiation with the defendant.[40]
The situation changed dramatically, however,  when  the  international  community  employed
financial incentives to encourage the Balkan authorities to transfer indictees  to  the  Tribunal  and
NATO agreed to arrest indictees.[41] Both developments meant that the caseload of the court  was
growing rapidly and that to hold  full  blown  trials  for  each  defendant  became  more  and  more
difficult. The pressure increased further  when  the  United  Nations  Security  Council  outlined  a
completion strategy in 2003 requiring bringing to a conclusion all trial  activities  at  first  instance
by the end of 2008.[42] Aside from a few procedural amendments[43] one of the major  strategies
to cope with the case load was to begin to allow plea bargaining. A contributing factor was  surely
a change in ICTY presidency when Antonio Cassese was succeeded by Gabrielle Kirk  McDonald
from  the  United  States,  where  the  majority  of  criminal  cases  are  dealt   with   through   plea
bargaining.[44]
Analysing the cases which the ICTY dealt with through plea agreements  one  can  distinguish
three  phases.[45]  In  the  first  ten  years  only  eight  cases  were   disposed   of   involving   plea
agreements   in   the   ICTY[46]   and   only    two    defendants    received    significant    sentence
concessions.[47]  The  first  defendant  at  the  ICTY  to  enter  into  a  plea   agreement   with   the
Prosecution was Stevan Todorovi?.[48] One has to note however, that the agreement  came  about
because of very special circumstances. Todorovi? claimed that he was unlawfully  kidnapped  and
handed over to NATO forces  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina  (SFOR).  When  he  filed  an  interlocutory
appeal challenging the legality  of  his  arrest  the  ICTY  Trial  Chamber  ordered  SFOR  and  the
participating  states  to  provide   Todorovi?   with   wide-ranging   and   potentially   embarrassing
information  about  the  incident.  Not  surprisingly  NATO,  the  United  States  and  other   states
protested vehemently.[49]  In  November  2000,  Defence  and  Prosecution  filed  a  joint  motion
reflecting a plea agreement whereby Stevan Todorovi?  would  plead  guilty  to  count  one  of  the
indictment.[50] Further, he would withdraw the interlocutory appeal and  the  allegations  that  his
arrest was unlawful. He also agreed to co-operate with the Prosecution and to testify against  other
suspects. In exchange the Prosecution would formally  request  the  withdrawal  of  counts  two  to
twenty-seven of the indictment. In addition they  agreed  to  recommend  to  the  Trial  Chamber  a
sentence range of between five years and twelve years[51] although the Prosecution expressed the
belief that if found guilty at trial Todorovi? would have been  sentenced  to  at  least  15-25  years’
imprisonment.[52] On 31 July 2001, he was sentenced to ten  years’  imprisonment  which  in  the
view of the Trial Chamber was a very significant  sentence  concession.[53]  Although  it  is  quite
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appeal the trial Chamber pointed out that “a guilty plea  is  always  important  for  the  purpose  of
establishing the truth in relation to a crime.”[54] Notwithstanding  the  exceptional  circumstances
of this case Todorovi? paved the way for future sentencing bargains. The Trial  Chamber  declared
for the first time that a guilty plea “should, in principle, give rise  to  a  reduction  in  the  sentence
that  the  accused  would  otherwise  have  received”.[55]  Five  months  after  this   first   case   of
sentencing  bargaining  the  ICTY  adopted  Rule  62ter  which  provides   for   the   procedure   of
approving plea agreements.[56]
A case  which  illustrates  the  court’s  growing  preoccupation  with  how  to  deal  with  cases
efficiently  is  Sikirica.[57]  The  three  defendants  (Du?ko  Sikirica,  Damir  Dosen  and   Dragan
Kolund?ija) were accused of not taking reasonable steps while they were in charge of the Keratem
Camp  to  prevent  the  atrocities  in  the  camp  and  even  of  having  participated.[58]  All   three
defendants were granted quite a low sentence although they entered their guilty plea long after the
trial had started and the Prosecution had already closed their case and despite the fact that they did
not agree to testify against other accused or to co-operate in any other way.[59]  In  its  sentencing
judgement the Court once again emphasised the mitigating effect of plea bargaining. Surprisingly,
the decision to enter a guilty plea seems to have been  given  more  value  than  the  expression  of
remorse. “The Trial Chamber considers that the primary factor to be  considered  in  mitigation  of
Du?ko Sikirica’s sentence is his decision to enter  a  guilty  plea,  although  it  will  also  take  into
account his expression of remorse.”[60]
Even more interesting is that the contribution to truth finding of  a  guilty  plea  appears  to  be
secondary to saving time and effort for the Tribunal:
A guilty plea facilitates the work of the International Tribunal in two ways. Firstly, by entering a plea of guilt
before the commencement of his trial, an accused will save the International Tribunal the time and effort of a
lengthy investigation and trial. Secondly, notwithstanding the timing of the guilty plea,  a  benefit  accrues  to
the Trial Chamber, because a guilty plea contributes directly  to  one  of  the  fundamental  objectives  of  the
International Tribunal: namely, its truth-finding function.[61]
In the second phase, during the years 2002 and  2003,  one  can  observe  a  strong  rise  in  the
numbers of guilty pleas and generous sentence recommendations. However, at the  same  time  the
discomfort of the judiciary seems to be growing  and  increasingly  the  Trial  Chambers  refuse  to
follow the negotiated sentence recommendations. In the case of Dragan  Nikoli?  for  example  the
judges disregarded the Prosecution’s sentencing recommendation of  fifteen  years  and  sentenced
the defendant to twenty-three years instead.[62] The Court declared that “the brutality, the number
of crimes  committed  and  the  underlying  intention  to  humiliate  and  degrade  would  render  a
sentence such as [the Prosecution] recommended unjust.”[63] But the Court  emphasised  that  the
defendant still received some concession for his guilty plea without which he would have received
a life sentence.[64]  Reading  this  case  closely  it  seems  that  the  Court  wanted  to  convey  the
impression that  the  fault  for  the  disappointed  expectation  lay  with  the  Prosecution  who  had
offered an unrealistically high discount which the Chamber could not follow. At the same time the
Chamber was anxious not to discourage future plea  agreements  and  stressed  that  the  defendant
had still benefited considerably.[65] However, the number of cases where the Trial Chamber went
beyond  the  Prosecution’s  recommendation   increased.   In   the   case   of   Momir   Nikoli?   the
Prosecution offered to recommend a sentence of fifteen  to  twenty  years’  imprisonment.  Instead
the Trial Chamber sentenced him to twenty-seven years[66] explaining “the  testimony  of  Momir
Nikoli? was evasive and […] an indication that his  willingness  to  co-operate  does  not  translate
into being fully forthcoming in relation to all the events, given his  position  and  knowledge”.[67]
Even in cases  where  the  Court  sentenced  according  to  the  agreement  judges  expressed  their
discomfort. In Deronji?[68] the  presiding  judge  Wolfgang  Schomburg  dissented  wholehearted
with the sentence reduction based on an agreement and declared that justice would  have  required
double of his ten years’ prison sentence.[69] Reading Deronji?’s witness  statement  in  the  Krsti?
Appeal hearing  it  becomes  clear  that  the  ICTY  had  information  about  more  involvement  of
Deronjic than is reflected in his charges and sentence.
After 2003 a third phase began, in which the number of guilty  pleas  decreased[70]  according
to Combs for three reasons. First, victims’ groups and legal commentators  increasingly  criticised
the in their view much too lenient sentences and the avoidance of public trial.[71] Second Michael
Johnson,  the  Chief  of  Prosecution  who  was  a  strong  advocate  of  plea  bargaining  and  who
promoted many agreements left The Hague in 2003.[72] The third  and  probably  most  important
reason for the drop in plea agreements however was that subsequent to the  repeated  rejections  of
the agreed sentence recommendation by the Court defendants lost the trust that the bargains would
stand.[73]
Looking at the development of plea bargaining at the ICTY it becomes clear that  initially  this
practice had been developed as a response to the growing case pressure. Although the ICTY noted
in 2003[74]  that  plea  bargaining  has  other  justifications  alongside  efficiency  initially  it  was
clearly introduced as a measure to cope with an increasing caseload and insufficient resources.  As
Petrig observes: “The timing of its introduction, after the docket had grown  considerably  and  the
efficiency  and  completion  discussion   was   launched   supports   this   conclusion”.[75]   Scharf
estimates that if “the ad hoc Tribunals had been given an additional  five  years  to  complete  their
mandate, then the need for plea-bargaining could have been avoided.”[76] In the remainder of this
section it will be discussed whether  this  mechanism  of  efficiency  can  be  used  to  enhance  the
historical record building function of international criminal procedures.
2 Encouraging Guilty Pleas
Plea bargaining offers one of the strongest incentives for defendants  to  enter  a  guilty  plea.  The
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allegations  at  trial  can  have  an  important  effect  on  the  credibility  of  the   historical   record.
Moreover, not challenging the allegations but admitting responsibility can  also  make  a  valuable
contribution to reconciliation. In Nikoli? the Court underlined that the “recognition  of  the  crimes
committed against the Bosnian Muslim population in 1995 […] by a  participant  in  those  crimes
contributes to establishing a historical record.”[77] The guilty plea of Plav?i? was  praised  by  the
Prosecution as “an unprecedented contribution to the establishment of truth and a significant effort
toward the advancement of reconciliation”.[78] Biljana Plav?i?, known as the ‘Serbian Iron Lady’
served under the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic as deputy and later  became  President  of
the Republika Srpska. Even though she did not directly participate in  the  atrocities  she  provided
important assistance by publicly promoting displacement and encouraging  Serbian  paramilitaries
to participate in the ‘ethnic cleansing’.[79] Although she repeatedly refused to testify against other
suspects, Plav?i? acknowledged that the Bosnian  Serb  leadership  had  been  responsible  for  the
wide  spread  ‘ethnic  cleansing’[80]  and  that   the   Bosnian   forces   with   support   of   Serbian
paramilitary units and even Yugoslavia’s army, implemented the  “objective  of  ethnic  separation
by force”.[81] No less than Madeleine Albright, then U.S. Secretary  of  State  during  the  Clinton
administration,  and  Dr  Alex  Boraine,  Deputy  Chairperson  of  the  South  African   Truth   and
Reconciliation  and  founding  President  of  the   International   Centre   for   Transitional   Justice
emphasised the contribution towards reconciliation in Bosnia Plav?i? made  with  her  guilty  plea.
Dr Boraine praised “the acknowledgement and acceptance of responsibility for grave  crimes,  and
the impact this can  have  on  the  process  of  reconciliation.”[82]  He  gave  four  reasons  for  the
significance of Plav?i?’s plea of guilty:
firstly, as the plea of guilty was offered by  a  Serb  nationalist  and  former  political  leader,  Mrs.  Plav?i?’s
confession sends out a crucial message about the true  criminal  nature  of  the  enterprise  in  which  she  was
involved; secondly, by surrendering and pleading guilty, Mrs. Plav?i?  is  also  sending  a  powerful  message
about the legitimacy of the International Tribunal and its functions; thirdly,  Mrs.  Plav?i?’s  apology  for  her
actions and her call on other leaders to examine their own conduct is of particular  importance;  and  fourthly,
the confession of guilt and acceptance of responsibility by Mrs. Plav?i? may  demonstrate  to  the  victims  of
the persecutory campaign that someone has acknowledged their personal suffering.[83]
Unlike Todorovi?, Plav?i? refused repeatedly to co-operate with the  court  beyond  her  guilty
plea, in particular to testify against Slobodan Milosevi?. Nevertheless the Trial Chamber held  that
the mitigation effect of the guilty plea outweighed the gravity of the crime,  because  she  admitted
responsibility for the deaths of tens of thousands  of  civilians.  Plav?i?  was  sentenced  to  eleven
years imprisonment with the possibility of early  release  for  good  behaviour[84]  on  grounds  of
four  mitigating  circumstances:  her  voluntary  surrender,  her   age,   her   post-conflict   conduct
(actively  supporting  and  being  instrumental   in   the   implementation   of   the   Dayton   Peace
Agreement by taking political and personal risks) and her guilty plea.[85]
It is hoped that if the leaders admit their guilt their followers  will  accept  the  truth  about  the
atrocities and accept  the  injustice  done  to  the  victims.  Confessions  of  important  leaders  will
diminish  the  risk  that  former  crimes  are  denied  or  justified.  Thus   an   admission   of   guilt,
encouraged by plea bargaining might contribute more to  reconciliation  than  the  conviction  of  a
defendant who is claiming his innocence or tries to justify the atrocities committed.  On  the  other
hand an admission which is submitted alone for tactical reasons will have the  opposite  effect.  As
soon as Plav?i? received early release after having served two thirds of  her  11-year  sentence  she
retracted her confession and declared “I sacrificed myself. I have done nothing  wrong.  I  pleaded
guilty to crimes against humanity so I could bargain for  the  other  charges.  If  I  hadn’t,  the  trial
would have lasted three, three and-a-half years. Considering my age that wasn’t an option.”[86]
This proof of lack of genuine remorse is confirmed by the fact that with  the  exception  of  her
testimony against Momcilo Kraji?nik, Plav?i? has consistently refused  any  cooperation  with  the
Tribunal. Her case proves that although plea bargaining can encourage admissions of guilt,  which
serve the historical record and reconciliation, it can also undermine both aims  if  the  incentive  of
the bargain is so strong that it triggers non insincere  admissions.  In  addition  to  this  there  are  a
number of aspects, which mean that plea bargaining can  undermine  the  building  of  a  historical
record.
3 Loss of Trial
The first problem is that plea bargaining bypasses the fact finding trial which has the  potential  of
making a very significant contribution to the historical record as  was  shown  above.  Rather  than
having a huge volume of evidence examined and being able to paint a detailed picture of what has
happened, the defendant agrees simply to  the  Prosecution’s  summary  of  facts.  Biljana  Plav?i?
when pleading guilty did not reveal any new  facts[87]  but  merely  confirmed  the  statement  the
Prosecutor has submitted in a short five-page document.[88] In  comparison,  a  judgement  of  the
ICTY tends to  comprise  several  hundreds  of  pages,[89]  and  trial  transcripts  run  into  tens  of
thousands of pages in addition to witness statements, official documents and other evidence.[90]
Furthermore, in case of a guilty plea the facts stated by the  Prosecution  and  admitted  by  the
Defence are not tested in trial under strict evidentiary rules and thus might not have credibility  for
the public. Taking again the example of Plav?i?, rather  than  accepting  the  new  truth  about  the
Serbian leadership, many Serbs disregarded the admission of guilt as treachery of Plav?i?  who  in
their eyes only agreed to these facts for her own personal benefits.[91]
Moreover the acceptance of a guilty plea bears the risk that important legal  questions  are  not
contested and discussed at trial. In the case of Erdemovi?, for example, the guilty  plea  avoided  a
full discussion of the question of duress at trial. In the  sentencing  judgement  the  Trial  Chamber
came to the conclusion that on“the  basis  of  the  case-by-case  approach  and  in  light  of  all  the
elements before it, the Trial Chamber is of the view that proof of the specific circumstances which
would fully exonerate the accused of his responsibility has not been provided.”[92]  This  question
should have been discussed in court where Erdemovi? would have had the opportunity  to  present
such evidence or even challenge the burden of proof in the first place.[93]
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The main problem regarding the aim of painting a comprehensive  historical  picture,  however,  is
the practice of charge bargaining, in which the prosecution withdraws charges  in  exchange  for  a
guilty plea to the remaining charges. Not  only  does  the  defendant  not  need  to  admit  or  reject
responsibility for the withdrawn crimes but moreover the facts  underlying  these  charges  are  not
read into the court records at all.  All  evidence  collected  for  these  charges  by  the  Prosecution,
including reliable eye witness statements, are lost for the  general  historical  record.  Even  worse,
when charges are dropped it is not recorded whether this is  part  of  an  agreement  or  because  of
lack of sufficient evidence on the part of the  Prosecution.[94]  This  means  that  the  dropping  of
charges can be interpreted as if those crimes have not happened at all.[95]
In Plav?i? of the two  counts  of  committing  genocide  and  complicity  in  genocide  and  six
counts  of  committing  crimes  against  humanity  all  except  one   charge   of   persecution   were
dropped.[96] Another case where the plea agreement  resulted  in  avoiding  a  trial  which  should
have taken place is Simi?,[97] which demonstrates very clearly how much importance is  given  to
efficiency considerations. Blagoje Simi? surrendered  voluntarily  to  the  ICTY  and  pleaded  not
guilty to all counts. Eight months after the trial began, on 15 May 2002, he pleaded  guilty  to  two
counts of torture as a crime against humanity in exchange for a low sentence recommendation (not
more than five years’ imprisonment) and the dropping of all other counts. A  bargain  was  offered
to the defendant although the Prosecution felt that they had good evidence and thus  good  chances
of a conviction  because  they  considered  that  the  ill  health  of  the  defendant  would  probably
prolong  the  trial  considerably.[98]  Considering  the  seriousness  of  all  the  charges  that   were
dropped notwithstanding a good chance of finding Simi? guilty of each of them the  low  sentence
cannot be justified by the savings in resources made.  In  Nikoli?  the  ICTY  pointed  out  that  the
sentence must mirror the responsibility of the defendant and “reflect the actual conduct and  crime
committed and must not simply reflect the agreement of the parties as to what would be a  suitable
settlement of the matter.”[99]
One of the most serious problems with  charge  bargaining  is  the  distortion  of  the  historical
record when too many charges of the  same  offence  are  dropped.  The  repeated  withdrawing  of
genocide  charges  in  favour  of  crimes  against  humanity  could  mean  that  it  might  never   be
established that genocide has actually taken place.[100] For groups who  deny  the  true  nature  of
the atrocities it will be very easy to declare that the  Prosecution  never  has  proven  genocide  has
happened  in  a  particular  conflict  whereas  in  reality  the   Prosecution   had   never   taken   the
opportunity to do  so.  Another  example  is  sexual  violence  which  forms  part  of  every  armed
conflict. A prosecutor of the ICTY explained[101] that many  defendants  refuse  to  admit  sexual
offences even where they are willing to admit other acts of violence. This means that  many  deals
are made which result in withdrawing charges of sexual violence. As a  result  a  huge  number  of
sexual offences are not made part of the historical record established by the courts. The ICTR  has
been proven to be very progressive in developing jurisdiction  in  sexual  crimes  and  making  this
horrible but typical side of armed conflicts visible. But charge bargaining could lead to  the  result
that the systematic victimisation of women and use of sexual violence as a weapon is disappearing
again from the public record. In addition, this experience could influence prosecution policies  and
practices in the long run, as it might be decided that thorough investigation in sexual crimes is  not
the best use of resources if these crimes are very likely to be bargained away later.
However if the historical facts of a certain situation have been already established in an earlier
case and the present case would not offer much new information the value of an additional trial  in
this respect is questionable. In such a case a brief admission of  guilt  to  facts  already  established
does not hinder the historical record effect of the court procedures in total.
5 Is the Guilty Plea Genuine?
Plea bargaining can only support the establishment of a historical record if it produces guilty pleas
which are genuine. A plea which is based on threats or an uninformed  decision  not  only  fails  to
establish an accurate historical record in this particular case but also it undermines  the  legitimacy
of the whole truth-finding process of the  court.  Unfortunately  the  experience  of  the  ICTY  has
shown that judges are not very diligent in investigating the validity of a guilty plea. An analysis of
the problems in this tribunal will lead on to proposals for future use of  the  practice,  especially  at
the ICC.
1 Development of Procedural Safeguard for Guilty Pleas
The first case in which the question of the validity of the guilty plea  was  raised  was  Erdemovi?.
Dra?en Erdemovi? was accused of having participated in  the  massacre  of  hundreds  of  Bosnian
Muslims civilians near Pilica.[102] He was indicted on one count of a crime against humanity and
an alternative count of a violation of the laws or customs of war.[103] The tribunal  dismissed  the
charge of violation of laws or customs of war and accepted the guilty plea for the count on  crimes
against  humanity.[104]  Handing  down  its  very  first  sentence  decision  the   ICTY   sentenced
Erdemovi? to ten years’ imprisonment.[105] This case was not the result of a  plea  agreement  but
is essential for the question of the necessary requirements of accepting  a  guilty  plea.[106]  When
Erdemovi?  appealed  against  his  sentence  arguing  that  his  defence  of  duress   had   not   been
considered sufficiently, the Appeal Chamber took the opportunity to question  the  validity  of  the
appellant’s guilty plea as well.[107] Being the first international criminal tribunal  that  introduced
the common law procedure  of  guilty  plea[108]  the  Appeal  Chamber  was  eager  to  clarify  its
procedure.  It  noted  the  benefits  of  accepting  a  guilty  plea  and  thus  avoiding   a   full-blown
trial.[109]
This common law institution of the guilty plea should, in our  view,  find  a  ready  place  in  an  international
criminal forum such as the International Tribunal confronted by cases  which,  by  their  inherent  nature,  are
very complex and necessarily require lengthy hearings if they go to trial under stringent financial  constraints
arising from allocations made by the United Nations itself dependent upon the contributions of States.[110]
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catalogue of defendants’ rights[111] can only be allowed if  the  procedure  of  accepting  the  plea
offers some safeguards itself. [112] Leaning on the  experience  of  common  law  systems  and  in
particular Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the  Appeal  Chamber  set  out  and
defined three requirements for  accepting  a  guilty  plea.  The  plea  must  be  entered  voluntarily,
knowingly, and unequivocally.  ‘Voluntary’  means  not  only  that  the  defendant  pleaded  guilty
without  threats,  inducements  or   promises[113]   but   also   that   they   would   understand   the
consequences of the plea.[114] A plea is ‘knowing’ if the  defendant  knows  and  understands  the
charges against them  and  all  the  elements  that  the  Prosecution  need  to  prove.  Moreover  the
defendant needs to comprehend the rights which are given up by waiving the  right  to  a  fair  trial
and the penal consequences. Thirdly, the plea must not be ambiguous or equivocal.[115]
The Trial Chamber’s acceptance of the guilty plea  in  Erdemovi?  was  problematic  for  three
reasons. Firstly, the Appeal Chamber was not convinced that the defendant had been aware of  the
rights and safeguards he  was  giving  up  by  waiving  his  right  to  a  fair  trial,  in  particular  the
presumption of innocence.[116] Secondly,  it  seems  that  the  defendant  did  not  understand  the
charges he was pleading guilty to. At  his  initial  appearance  he  had  been  confronted  with  two
alternative  charges  and  been  asked  simply  whether  to  plead   guilty   or   not   guilty   without
distinguishing between the two crimes.[117] He did not receive an explanation and very  probably
did not understand  the  differences  between  the  two  alternative  charges.[118]  He  first  simply
pleaded guilty without specifying to which count[119] and then  to  the  more  serious  crime[120]
which suggests that he did not grasp  the  differences  between  the  two  offences.  Thirdly,  while
pleading  guilty  he  kept  emphasising  that  he  had   acted   under   the   threat   of   being   killed
himself.[121] This suggests that he admitted parts of the offence but did not hold himself guilty as
he believed he had a legal defence.[122] A plea which indicates that on the one  hand  the  charges
are admitted but at the same time deny responsibility is  inherently  contradictory  and  ambiguous
and must not be  accepted.[123]Although  his  counsel  was  present  at  the  time  of  the  plea  the
defendant  understood  neither  the  nature  of  the  offences  he  was  charged  with   nor   possible
defences. The Appeal Chamber ordered that Erdemovi? be given  the  opportunity  to  plead  again
and he pleaded guilty before the  Trial  Chamber  IIter  to  murder  as  a  violation  of  the  laws  or
customs of war and was sentenced to five years.[124]
Only a month after the appeal  decision  the  judges  of  the  ICTY  adopted  at  the  Fourteenth
Plenary Session on 12 November 1997 Rule 62bis of the Rules of  Procedure  and  Evidence.[125]
Following the Appeal Chamber, Rule 62bis requires  that  the  guilty  plea  is  entered  knowingly,
voluntarily, and unequivocally, and that there  is  a  factual  basis  to  support  the  plea.  However,
surprisingly the new  rule  does  not  incorporate  the  detailed  requirements  of  Rule  11  nor  the
detailed ruling of the Appeal Chamber. Neither does  it  offer  definitions  of  these  principles  nor
does it give any guidelines on how the Trial Chamber is expected to find that  the  plea  meets  the
requirements.
2 Implementation of Procedural Safeguard for Guilty Pleas
According to Cook this vagueness of the new procedure led to a “hodgepodge judicial approach to
Rule 62bis”.[126] A look at the transcripts of the Trial Chamber hearings when accepting a  guilty
plea reveals that even the rudimentary requirements of Rule 62bis were fulfilled only formally  by
the court.
THE ACCUSED PLAV?I?: [Interpretation] I plead guilty.
JUDGE MAY: You plead guilty. The Rules of the Tribunal require that the Trial  Chamber
is satisfied that a plea of guilty  has  been  made  voluntarily,  that  it  is  informed  and  not
equivocal, and that there is a sufficient factual basis for the crime and  the  participation  of
the accused in it. Mrs. Plav?i?, in the plea agreement which we have read, you have signed a declaration
that you entered into the agreement freely and voluntarily, understanding its terms, and having  been  advised
by your lawyers. You have also signed a statement to  the  same  effect  in  which  is  added  that  the  plea  is
informed and unequivocal. Do you confirm that those declarations are correct?
THE ACCUSED PLAV?I?: [Interpretation] I do.[127]
Although Judge May checked formally whether the requirements of Rule 62bis were  satisfied
he did not ask about any of the elements. If Rule 62bis is to be taken  seriously  it  is  necessary  to
examine carefully whether each of the requirements is  met,  for  example  whether  the  defendant
understands each element of the offence that the Prosecution need to  prove  or  the  extent  of  the
rights the defendant is going to lose when giving up the right to trial. The Chamber did nothing  to
convince itself that the defendant understood either the rights she gave up or the  consequences  of
her decision. The Court obviously treated this part of the procedure  as  a  mere  formality  trusting
that the lawyers had done their job of informing the defendant adequately.  However,  the  duty  to
protect the defendant against abuse of procedure lies according to Rule 62bis  with  the  court  and
cannot be delegated to the defence counsel.
Another example is the case of Ranko ?e?i? who  pleaded  guilty  to  all  of  the  six  counts  of
crimes against humanity and six violations of the laws or customs of war[128] and was  sentenced
to  eighteen  years  imprisonment.[129]  When  accepting  the  guilty  plea  the   judge   asked   the
defendant  only  whether  he  understood  that   the   court   was   not   bound   by   the   sentencing
recommendations of the Prosecution and whether he  entered  the  agreement  voluntarily  and  not
due to threats or undue force. There was no reference to the other requirements of Rule 62bis[130]
and neither the fact that he was giving up the presumption of innocence, nor  the  elements  of  the
offences that the Prosecution need to prove nor the maximum possible  sentence  were  mentioned
to the defendant.[131] The court declared that the requirements were fulfilled  but  ?e?i?  was  not
asked about them.[132] Except for  changing  his  plea  from  not  guilty  to  guilty[133]  and  then
pleading guilty to each of the counts the accused only spoke three times at the hearing himself:  he
confirmed that it was his signature on the agreement[134], he confirmed  that  he  understood  that
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the agreement voluntarily.[136] Defence counsel declared that the accused understood  all  aspects
of  the  plea  agreement[137]  but  the  Chamber  did  not  endeavour  to  convince  itself  that   the
defendant himself had the necessary understanding.
Both cases show that the judges are aware of the  safeguards  of  the  procedural  rules  against
abuse of plea bargaining but do not really implement them. Rule 62bis  is  mentioned,  or  at  least
some of the requirements are referred to, but none of the elements are examined  in  any  detail.  If
the guilty plea is based on one of  the  situations  which  Rule  62bis  is  designed  to  prevent  (for
example the defendant was threatened) the  defendant  will  give  all  the  answers  they  think  are
expected from them. A formalaic approach to Rule 62bis will  thus  not  be  able  to  identify  such
situations.
A related problem is that some Chambers use a shortcut to Rule 62bis by asking the defendant
to confirm the fulfilment of all elements in one single compound question. An example is the case
of Mr?a.[138] The defendant was charged with two counts of  crimes  against  humanity  and  one
count of violations of the  laws  or  customs  of  war.  After  entering  a  plea  agreement  with  the
Prosecution Mr?a changed his plea of not guilty at his initial appearance to a guilty plea to  counts
two and three.[139] After the  Court  summarised  the  plea  agreement  in  total  the  accused  was
simply asked whether he understood the documents. [140]  With  his  brief  reply  “Your  Honour,
everything is clear to me” the Court seems to have satisfied  itself  that  all  requirements  of  Rule
62bis had been fulfilled. The judge mentioned some of the rights he would  give  up[141]  but  the
list is far from complete and the presumption of innocence and the  prosecutor’s  burden  of  proof
were  missing.  In  the  case  of  Babi?[142]  the  court  considered  each  of  the  factors  of  Rules
62bis and read the entire plea agreement into the record.[143] When after  the  reading  the  whole
document  of  fifteen  pages,  the  court  asked  the  defendant   whether   he   was   aware   of   the
consequences of entering a guilty plea, Babi? answered simply: “Your Honour, I am aware”.[144]
This  general  information  was  deemed  to  be  sufficient  that  the  defendant  was   appropriately
safeguarded. Although this case is an improvement because it at least listed all the criteria of  Rule
62bis the fact that the defendant was asked to confirm all elements  together  is  questionable.  The
court should  convince  itself  that  each  of  the  elements  are  understood  and  confirmed  by  the
defendant.
Since  the  Court  is  not  bound  by  the  agreement  between  Prosecution   and   Defence   the
defendant cannot risk  to  do  anything  that  would  cast  a  doubt  on  their  genuine  remorse  and
provoke the court to disregard the sentence recommendation of the Prosecution. Cook makes clear
that under these circumstances the defendant has hardly a chance to take advantage of Rule  62bis.
“With a defendant fully inclined to appear cooperative  and  deferential,  and  fully  disinclined  to
appear inquisitorial or confrontational, the court’s cursory examination of Babic hardly suffices as
a legitimate barometer of the defendant’s acumen regarding the plea decision.”[145]
By taking  together  all  questions  of  Rule  62bis  into  one  compound  question  the  court  is
supporting this assumption rather than really attempting to find out whether all  the  conditions  of
Rule  62bis  are  met  and  the  defendant  really  entered  the  plea  voluntarily  and   informed.   A
compound  question  considering  more  than  one  element  of  Rule  62bis  should   therefore   be
prohibited.
Developing a Strategy
“The prospect of spending the rest of his life behind bars was, his counsel believes, of  less
concern to his defendant than was his opportunity to  create  through  his  trial  a  historical
record that might, even many years from now, vindicate his view of the conflict.”[146]
An interesting turn in the question of the relationship between plea  bargaining  and  the  historical
record is the experience of the ICTR. Combs found  in  her  empirical  research  that  the  sentence
discount seems to be the major incentive for defendants at the ICTY but does not  seem  to  play  a
major role in the ICTR[147] and indeed the number of plea agreements is here much lower.[148]
The national criminal justice system of Rwanda is based on the French  and  Belgium  systems
which are civil law countries with inquisitorial  systems  and  like  Yugoslavia  and  the  successor
states, Rwanda does not engage in plea bargaining. Nevertheless,  like  the  ICTY  the  ICTR  also
amended its Rules of Procedure and Evidence  (ICTR-RPE)[149]  to  provide  for  the  guilty  plea
procedure.[150] What is most striking when looking at the guilty pleas of the ICTR  is  that  while
plea bargaining seems to spread over the whole world this court does  not  manage  to  establish  a
culture of guilty pleas. This is true despite the fact that the court itself spent some efforts to do so.
The arguably most important case of the ICTR is the case against  the  former  Prime  Minister
Jean-Paul Kambanda. At his initial appearance on 1 May 1998 he  pleaded  guilty  to  all  charges,
i.e. one count of genocide, one count of conspiracy to commit genocide, one  count  of  direct  and
public incitement to commit genocide, one count  of  complicity  in  genocide,  and  one  count  of
crimes    against    humanity    (murder),    and    one    count     of     crimes     against     humanity
(extermination).[151] In  addition  he  offered  right  from  the  beginning  to  co-operate  with  the
Prosecution and promised to testify for the Prosecution in  those  trials.[152]  He  provided  ninety
hours of recorded evidence which was “invaluable information” [153] that was later  used  against
other leaders. This co-operation was based on a written plea  agreement  between  Kambanda  and
the Prosecution which explicitly “records that no  agreements,  understandings  or  promises  have
been made between the  parties  with  respect  to  sentence  which,  it  is  acknowledged,  is  at  the
discretion of the Trial Chamber.”[154] Nevertheless for his early plea and  extensive  co-operation
Kambanda had expected a huge sentence discount, an expectation which  must  have  been  shared
by his counsel who argued for only two years’ imprisonment.[155] In spite of his  confession  and
full co-operation the Court refused however to give any  sentence  concession,  and  following  the
Prosecution’s recommendation it  sentenced  Kambanda  to  life  imprisonment.[156]  Although  it
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outweigh the aggravating circumstances.[157] The denial  of  a  sentence  reduction  is  surprising:
Kambanda had pleaded guilty before any other trial at  the  ICTR  was  completed.[158]  Thus  the
Tribunal had here the opportunity to send a  powerful  message  to  other  accused  and  encourage
them to plead guilty. Secondly,  given  the  early  plea  and  the  extent  of  co-operation  the  Trial
Chamber could easily have justified a more lenient sentence.[159] Further, one of the  aggravating
factors,  Kambanda’s  political  position  could  actually  have  been  counted  as  mitigation.[160]
Although the Trial Chamber in Plav?i? agreed  with  the  Prosecution[161]  that  Biljana  Plav?i?’s
former position as President of the Republika Srpska was an aggravating factor it pointed out  that
an admission of guilt of a political leader has  special  value  for  reconciliation.[162]  Hearing  his
sentence  Kambanda  immediately  stopped  co-operation   with   the   Prosecution   and   filed   an
appeal[163] claiming among other things that the  Trial  Chamber  had  not  considered  his  guilty
plea as a  mitigating  factor  to  discount  his  sentence.[164]  The  Appeal  Chamber  unanimously
rejected the appeal and confirmed the sentence.[165]
In this case the defendant had already provided a huge amount of invaluable information to the
Prosecution, which not only helped other prosecutions and convictions but also contributed to  the
historical  record.  In  this  regard  the  Prosecution  did  not  need   to   offer   a   lenient   sentence
recommendation.  However,  the  disappointment  of  the  defendant   who   felt   betrayed   in   his
agreement had a long term effect on other defendants and contributed to the general  reluctance  to
enter into plea agreements.[166] This case shows that if a court decides to develop the  practice  of
plea agreement it has to establish some long-term  strategy.  Plea  bargaining  is  a  practice  which
cannot be used only in isolated cases.
The ICTR seemed to try to undo the damage in Serushago.[167] Omar Serushago  surrendered
to the ICTR in April 1997 although he was not indicted by the court,[168]  and  pleaded  guilty  at
his initial appearance on 14 December 1998.[169] He provided full co-operation before  and  after
his trial and submitted information against many other high-level defendants.  Serushago  was  the
first  case  in  which  the  Prosecution  recommended  a  sentence  below  life  imprisonment.[170]
Emphasising  the  defendant’s  extensive  co-operation  they  recommended  a  twenty-five  years’
prison sentence. [171] The Trial Chamber acknowledged the mitigating  effect  of  the  guilty  plea
and other mitigating circumstances such as his co-operation  with  the  Prosecution,  his  character,
his regret and remorse, and his assistance to victims.[172] Surprisingly,  the  Trial  Chamber  went
even below the  Prosecution’s  recommendation  and  sentenced  him  to  only  fifteen  years.[173]
However, neither the low sentence in Serushago nor the explicit promises by both  the  Court  and
the Prosecution of significant sentence concessions for guilty pleas achieved a considerable rise in
guilty pleas as the ICTY experienced in 2002 and 2003. Indeed the ICTR had to wait for over four
years for the next guilty plea.
Vincent Rutaganira who was the fourth guilty plea at the  ICTR  pleaded  guilty  in  December
2004.[174] Six years after the Prosecution had issued an indictment against Rutaganira in 1996 he
surrendered voluntarily in February 2002.  After  he  pleaded  guilty  to  one  count  of  aiding  and
abetting exterminations as a crime against humanity the Prosecution  not  only  dropped  the  other
five counts but even asked the Trial Chamber to acquit him  on  these  counts  because  of  lack  of
sufficient evidence.[175] Further the Prosecution recommended a very  low  sentence  of  between
six and eight years and that this sentence should be served in  Europe  or  Swaziland.[176]  It  was
also explicitly stated in the plea agreement that there would not be any  further  co-operation  with
the Prosecution.[177] The Trial Chamber sentenced him to six years and  acquitted  him  from  the
other charges.[178] Rutaganira was the first case before the ICTR of explicit sentence  bargaining
as for the first time the Prosecution committed itself to a specific sentence recommendation range.
It  is  also  the  first  case  of  charge  bargaining.[179]  Combs  argues  that   the   reason   for   the
Prosecution to give so many concessions for so little admissions by the  defendant  was  a  lack  of
sufficient evidence for the charges Rutaganira did not plead guilty to.[180] However in my view it
is fair to conclude that since Serushago did not have the hoped effect of  encouraging  guilty  pleas
the Prosecution started to make better offers to defendants. Most of all  the  Prosecution  began  to
offer  the   security   of,   if   not   a   binding   sentence   promise,   at   least   a   binding   sentence
recommendation.
In Ruggiu the ICTR tried to stimulate guilty  pleas  by  using  the  opportunity  to  praising  the
guilty plea because it  “facilitates  the  administration  of  justice  by  expediting  proceedings  and
saving resources ( ... ) [saving] the Tribunal a  lengthy  investigation  and  trial,  thus  economising
time, effort and resources.”[181] Citing Erdemovi?  the  court  pointed  out  that  rewarding  guilty
pleas with sentence concessions encourages other suspects to come forward.[182] Indeed the Trial
Chamber   explicitly   targeted   other   suspects   and   perpetrators   promising   some    form    of
concession.[183] When  the  Prosecution  was  criticised  for  the  low  sentence  by  the  Rwandan
government Chief of Prosecutions Mohamed Othman explained that  it  was  “a  good  gesture  for
other accused who would wish to plead guilty and accept responsibility for their crimes.”[184]
Although the Court and the Prosecution  tried  now  to  engage  in  plea  negotiations  in  many
cases[185] one still finds  surprisingly  few  guilty  pleas  at  the  ICTR.  The  findings  of  Comb’s
research came to the surprising conclusion  that  the  reasons  why  most  defendants  at  the  ICTR
refuse to plead guilty is that they truly believe they are not guilty of the  crimes  they  are  charged
with.[186] They argue that it was an armed conflict  between  the  Rwandan  government  and  the
RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) and criticise that no member  of  the  RPF  was  prosecuted.  More
importantly, most defendants  reject  the  notion  that  the  atrocities  of  1994  in  Rwanda  can  be
classified as genocide.[187] While they agree that the conflict resulted in excessive  violence  they
insist there was no genocidal intent against the Tutsi. [188] However, the reasons are different  for
high-level and low-level offenders:
High-level ICTR defendants, for instance, are so convinced of their innocence, so ideologically committed to
their characterization of the Rwandan conflict, and so concerned about their place in  the  history  books  that
virtually no sentence inducement will persuade them to plead guilty to  genocide.  Low-level  Special  Panels
defendants, by contrast, are  so  ignorant  about  their  legal  rights  and  so  culturally  disposed  to  admitting
wrongdoing and seeking reconciliation that, absent the constraining hand of counsel, no sentence inducement
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Combs  argue  that  one  reason  for  the  reluctance  of  guilty  pleas  at  the  ICTR  is  that  the
defendants are mostly “senior politicians, military leaders, or influential business people” and thus
are  highly  concerned  with  the  characterisation   of   the   conflict   and   their   own   “historical
legacy”.[190] The label of the offence as well as the historical picture  painted  by  the  tribunal  is
essential for these defendants. Combs argues that defendants are willing to admit the violence they
are responsible for but ”cannot admit to taking  part  in  a  genocide  because  doing  so  would  be
fundamentally  at  odds  with  the   defendant   community’s   long-held   characterisation   of   the
violence.”[191]
These findings support my argument that plea bargaining can distort the historical record even
though in the case of the ICTR it is the defendants who reject the idea of a bargain  which  distorts
history as it has happened in their view.
5. Conclusions
“This  ‘historical’  dimension  of  international  criminal  trials,  which  has   some   merits,
complicates matters even further and often leads the proceedings far beyond  their  purpose
of being instrumental to the ascertainment of specific individual responsibilities.”[192]
It has been shown  that  the  establishment  of  a  historical  record  is  a  fundamental  function  of
international criminal trials. Plea bargaining is an ambiguous tool that can both further and  hinder
this aim. Charge bargaining can distort the historical  record  while  inauthentic  pleas  destroy  the
legitimacy  of  the  court.  One  the  other  hand  plea  bargaining  is  the  strongest   incentive   for
perpetrators to admit their guilt and reveal the  truth  and  thus  support  peace  and  reconciliation.
Referring to the ICTY it was claimed that “confessions required for a deal are  finally  helping  the
tribunal to fulfil one of its central missions: persuading Balkan nations accustomed to  considering
themselves victims that their forces committed terrible crimes.”[193]
The question of how to use plea bargaining in a  way  that  advances  rather  than  obstruct  the
historical record is essential because plea bargaining is expected to be used in all international and
hybrid courts.[194] In particular the ICC has to take advantage of being able to  draw  conclusions
from the experience of other international courts and to design procedures to reap  the  benefits  of
plea  bargaining  while  avoiding  the  disadvantages  of  this  practice.  As  was  shown   above   a
regulation of plea agreements  in  the  Rules  of  Procedures  alone  does  not  guarantee  that  plea
bargaining is used only in appropriate situations. Rather Court and Prosecution need  to  be  aware
of the far reaching consequences of a plea agreement and develop an adequate practice  taking  the
different interests into consideration. The ICC[195] must not wait until an overwhelming caseload
forces  the  courtroom  actors  to  develop  informally  a  practice  of  plea   bargaining   based   on
considerations of efficiency. Instead the Court should reflect now on the  advantages  and  dangers
of plea bargaining and design a  procedure  that  safeguards  not  only  the  interest  of  defendants,
victims  and  the  international  community  but  also  the  legitimacy  of   the   Court   itself.   Plea
bargaining must not be regarded  as  a  convenient  informal  shortcut  to  avoid  trials  but  can  be
utilised as a mechanism to build the historical record.
Three aspects emerged from the analysis of ICTY cases that are crucial: first,  the  disposal  of
full trials should be used only rarely because a criminal trial is one of the  most  effective  ways  to
establish an accurate historical record. Only when facts are already established in earlier cases can
it be justified to replace the trial with an agreement.
Secondly, the question of whether to facilitate plea negotiations with an accused should not be
seen in isolation of the individual case but in the context of the whole situation. It must be kept  in
mind that the result of extensive plea bargaining might lead to a distorted  picture  painted  by  the
Court. The Prosecution has to make sure that plea bargaining does not lead to a particular  kind  of
crime, for example  sexual  violence,  disappearing  from  the  public  record.  Especially  in  cases
where  the  outcome  of  a  legal  evaluation  is  uncertain[196]  the  Prosecution  must   avoid   the
temptation of turning away  from  the  challenge  of  the  trial.  Instead  the  Court  must  have  the
opportunity  to  clarify  this  question  in  public  with  all  sides  presenting  their  arguments   and
evidence. The question of which cases are appropriate for plea bargaining needs to  be  made  part
of the Prosecutional strategy and policies including explicit selection criteria.
Thirdly, it has to be remembered that the historical record of  a  criminal  trial  can  only  claim
legitimacy if it is established by the strict rules of procedure. Only if the guilty plea is genuine can
the Court afford to neglect its  mandate  and  dispose  of  the  case  without  full  trial.  In  order  to
maintain legitimacy and credibility, the Court has to take  the  safeguards  seriously  and  examine
each guilty plea, especially when based on a  plea  agreement.  The  rules  set  out  by  the  Appeal
Chamber  in  Erdemovi?  offer  appropriate  protection  and  even  in  its  curtailed  form  of   Rule
62bis provide for valuable safeguards for the defendant. Article 65(1) Rome Statute[197] is  based
on Rule 62bis. However, the experience of the ICTY  has  shown  that  the  central  question  is  to
what extent the Court is really examining each of the elements seriously. Of course the  Court  has
only limited possibilities to ascertain the understanding of a  defendant  or  inspect  whether  there
has been any undue pressure if the defendant claims there has not been  any.  However,  the  Court
could ask why the  defendant  changed  their  non  guilty  plea  to  a  guilty  plea  and  enquire  the
conditions under which the plea agreement was made.[198] Moreover, the Court can take the time
to explain the different charges, the consequences of entering a guilty plea, most of  all  the  rights
which the  defendant  is  giving  up  by  waiving  their  right  to  trial.  Germany  for  example  has
introduced a new  provision  in  its  Criminal  Procedure  Code  that  requires  the  Court  (and  not
counsel) to inform the defendant about the requirements and the consequences of an admission  of
guilt based on an agreement.[199] I propose that this duty of information  should  also  be  laid  on
the ICC. Based on the experience of  Erdemovi?  the  Court  could  also  enquire  if  the  defendant
5
5claims any form of defence. [200]
To summarise I argue that international  criminal  courts  and  tribunals[201]  should  use  plea
bargaining to establish not only the guilt of offenders but also to further the historical record if the
following three conditions are met:
1) Fact finding through trial
The broader picture of a certain situation, be it the legal  classification  of  an  atrocity  (for
example as genocide) or the fact of a certain crime (for example a certain massacre) or  the
pattern of certain crimes (for example use of sexual violence as  a  systematic  weapon)  or
the  wider  context  (for  example  widespread  attack  on  civilian  population)   is   already
established through other cases so  that  a  trial  of  the  present  defendant  would  not  add
significantly to these findings.
2) No distortion of history
Charge bargaining is only used in the context of the broader picture of all cases and as part
of the prosecutorial strategy that ensures that no aspect  of  the  conflict  such  as  a  certain
type of crime disappears from the historical record.
3) Validity of the Plea
The court examines carefully whether the plea is genuine, i.e. whether it has  been  entered
voluntarily, informed and unequivocally and is based on established facts.
These three conditions mean that the Court needs  to  keep  the  broader  picture  of  the  whole
situation and not just the individual case in mind. Also they need to spend more time and effort on
examining the validity of the plea. Of course this means the admission of  guilt  hearing[202]  will
take  longer.  However,  considering  the  resources  saved  through  avoiding  a  whole   trial   and
considering the importance of the guilty plea this investment in examining the validity of the  plea
is worth the extra effort. Applying the safeguards listed above plea bargaining can be used without
losing legitimacy of the procedure and without compromising the Court’s  function  of  building  a
historical  record.  As  Hans-Peter  Marsch  reminds  us:  “the  procedure  gives  legitimacy  to  the
result”.[203] 
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